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IMMORALITY AS A PHILOSOPHIC PRINCIPLE.

NIETZSCHE'S EMOTIONALISM.

PHILOSOPHIES are world-conceptions presenting three main features: (1) A systematic comprehension of the knowledge of their age; (2) An emotional attitude toward the cosmos; and (3) A principle that will serve as a basis for rules of conduct. The first feature determines the worth of the several philosophical systems in the history of mankind, being the gist of that which will last, and giving them strength and backbone. The second one, however, appeals powerfully to the sentiments of those who are imbued with the same spirit and thus constitutes its immediate acceptability; while the ethics of a philosophy becomes the test by which its use and practicability can be measured. Our own ideal has been to harmonise these three features, by making the first the regulator of the second and basis of the third. What we need is truth; our fundamental emotion must be truthfulness, and our ethics must be a living of the truth. Truth is not something that we can fashion according to our pleasure; it is not subjective; its very nature is objectivity; but we must render it subjective by a love of truth; we must make it our own, and by doing so our conduct in life will unfailingly adjust itself. Former philosophies made the subjective element predominant, and thus every philosopher worked out a philosophy of his own, endeavoring to be individual and original. The aim of our philosophy has been to reduce the subjective to its proper sphere, and to establish, in agreement with the scientific spirit of the age, a philosophy of objective validity.

Among all the philosophies of modern times there is perhaps

none which in its inmost principle is more thoroughly opposed to our own than Nietzsche's, and yet there are some points of mutual contact which are well worth being pointed out. The problem which is at the basis of Nietzsche's thought is the same as in our philosophy, but our solution is radically different.¹

Friedrich Nietzsche is a philosopher who astonishes his readers by the boldness with which he rebels against every tradition; tearing down the holiest and dearest things, preaching destruction of all rule, and looking with disdain upon the heap of ruins in which his revolutionary thoughts would leave the world.



FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.

For more than a century Germany has been the storm-center of philosophical thought. The commotions that started in the Fatherland reached other countries, France, England, and the United States, after they had lost their force at home. Kant's transcendentalism and Hegel's phenomenalism began to flourish among the English-speaking races after having become almost extinct in the home of their founders. Prof. R. M. Wenley of the

¹ For an account of Nietzsche's life and works we refer the reader to the article "Friedrich Nietzsche's Ueberschensch," by Drs. Goebel and Antrim in the present number of *The Monist*.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., expresses this truth with his native Scotch wit in the statement which I do not hesitate to endorse, that "German professors when they die go to Oxford."

It is now about time that Schopenhauerianism and Nietzscheanism should reach us. The former has made its influence felt for a considerable time, and the latter is just making its appearance. Schopenhauer has been introduced to Anglo-Saxon readers by Haldane and Bailey Saunders; and Macmillan & Co. are now publishing translations of Nietzsche's works.¹

Nietzsche represents a type of most modern date. He is a genius after the heart of Lombroso. He is abnormal,² titanic in his pretensions and aims, and, breaking down under the burden of his own thought, tragically ends his career in an insane asylum.

The mental derangement of Nietzsche may be an unhappy accident but appears to come as the natural result of his philosophy. Nietzsche, by nature modest and tractable, almost submissive, was, as a thinker, too proud to submit to anything, not even to truth. Schopenhauer had taught him that the intellect, the comprehension of truth, is a mere slave of the will. Truth has a purpose; it must accommodate itself to the self; the self is sovereign; the self wants to assert itself; the self alone has a right to exist; and the self that does not dare to be itself is a servile, menial creature. Therefore Nietzsche preaches the ethics of self-assertion and pride. He is too proud to recognise the duty of inquiry, the duty of adapting his

¹ Macmillan wisely began with the most noted books of Nietzsche's works, viz., *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Vol. VIII.; *A Genealogy of Morals and Poems*, Vol. X.; and *The Case of Wagner, The Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, Vol. XI. We hope that the plan of publishing Nietzsche's complete works will not be abandoned.

² It is characteristic of Nominalistic thinkers, viz., of all those who do not recognise an objective norm for truth, health, reason, and normality of any kind, to regard the *average* as the sole method of finding a norm. If, however, the average type is the standard of measurement, the unusually excellent specimens, being rare in number, must be classed together with all other deviations from the average, and thus the genius is regarded as abnormal as much as the criminal,—a theory which has found many admirers in this age that is sicklied over with agnosticism, the modern offshoot of nominalism. The truth is that true genius (not the pseudo-genius of erratic minds, not the would-be genius of those who make a failure of life) is uncommonly normal,—I had almost said "abnormally normal."

mind to the world, or of recognising the cosmic order of the universe as superior to his self. He feels bigger than the cosmos; he is himself; and he wants to be himself. His own self is sovereign; and if the world is not satisfied to submit to his will, the world may go to ruin; if it breaks to pieces, it will cause him to laugh only; even if, on the other hand, his self in this conflict is forced to the wall, he will still not suffer himself from very pride to abandon his principle of the absolute sovereignty of selfhood.

Nietzsche's philosophy is unique in being throughout the expression of an emotion,—the proud sentiment of a self-sufficient sovereignty. It rejects with disdain both the methods of the intellect, which submits the problems of life to an investigation, and the demands of morality, which recognise the existence of duty. Nietzsche claims that there is no objective science save by the permission of the sovereign self, nor is there any "ought," except for slaves. He prides himself as "the first Immoralist."

NIETZSCHE THE NOMINALIST.

The history of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, according to Nietzsche, is a progress of the idea that objective truth (a conception of "the true world") is not only not attainable, but that it does not exist at all. He expresses this idea in his *Twilight of the Idols*, English edition, pp. 122-123, under the caption "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable," which reads as follows:

"The true world attainable by the wise, the pious, and the virtuous man,—he lives in it, he embodies it.

"(Oldest form of the idea, relatively rational, simple, and convincing. Transcription of the proposition, 'I, Plato, am the truth.')

"2. The true world unattainable at present, but promised to the wise, the pious, and the virtuous man (to the sinner who repents).

"(Progress of the idea: it becomes more refined, more insidious, more incomprehensible,—it becomes feminine, it becomes Christian.)

"3. The true world unattainable, undemonstrable, and unable to be promised; but even as conceived, a comfort, an obligation, and an imperative.

"(The old sun still, but shining only through mist and scepticism; the idea become sublime, pale, northerly, Kœnigsbergian.)

"4. The true world—unattainable? At any rate unattained. And being un-

attained also unknown. Consequently also neither comforting, saving, nor obligatory: what obligation could anything unknown lay upon us?

"(Gray morning. First yawning of reason. Cock-crowing of Positivism.)

"5. The 'true world'—an idea neither good for anything, nor even obligatory any longer,—an idea become useless and superfluous; consequently a refuted idea: let us do away with it!

"(Full day; breakfast; return of *bon sens* and cheerfulness; Plato blushing for shame; infernal noise of all free intellects.)

"6. We have done away with the true world: what world is left? perhaps the seeming? . . . But no! in doing away with the true, we have also done away with the seeming world!

"(Noon; the moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; climax of mankind: *Incipit Zarathustra!*)"

The reader will ask, "What next?" Probably afternoon and evening, and then in the night the sun, which (according to Nietzsche) grew pale in the morning, will shine again.

According to Nietzsche the universe is not a cosmos but a chaos. He says (*La Gaya Scienza*, German edition, p. 148):

"The astral order in which we live is an exception. This order and the relative stability which is thereby caused, made the exception of exceptions possible,—the formation of organisms. The character-total of the world is into all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a missing necessity, but of missing order, articulation, form, beauty, wisdom, and as all our æsthetic humanities may be called."

In agreement with this conception of order, Nietzsche says of man, the rational animal:

"I fear that animals look upon man as a being of their own kind, which in a most dangerous way has lost the sound animal-sense,—as a lunatic animal, a laughing animal, a crying animal, a miserable animal." (*La Gaya Scienza*, German edition, p. 196.)

Man's reason, according to the consistent Nominalist view, is purely subjective and has no prototype in the objective world. John Stuart Mill regards the theorems of logic and mathematics, not only not as truths, but as positive untruths. He says:

"The points, lines, circles, and squares, which any one has in his mind, are (I apprehend) simply copies of the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience. Our idea of a point, I apprehend to be simply our idea of the *minimum visible*, the smallest portion of surface which we can see. A line, as defined by geometers, is wholly inconceivable. We can reason about a line as

if it had no breadth; because we have a power, which is the foundation of all the control we can exercise over the operations of our minds; the power, when a perception is present to our senses, or a conception to our intellects, of *attending* to a part only of that perception or conception, instead of the whole. But we cannot *conceive* a line without breadth; we can form no mental picture of such a line: all the lines which we have in our minds are lines possessing breadth."

Nietzsche shows his nominalistic tendencies by repeatedly pronouncing the same propositions in almost literally the same words,¹ without, however, acknowledging the school in which he picked up this error.

It is quite true that mathematical lines and circles are human conceptions, but they are not purely subjective conceptions, still less untruths; they are great and important discoveries. They are not arbitrarily devised but constructed according to the laws of the uniformities that dominate existence. They represent actual features of the objective universe, and thus only is it possible that the astronomer through the calculation of mathematical curves can predict the motion of the stars. Reason is the key to the universe, because it is the reflex of the cosmic order, and the cosmic order, the intrinsic regularity and immanent harmony of the uniformities of nature are not a subjective illusion but an objective reality.

When Goethe claims that all things transitory are symbols of that which is intransitory and eternal, Nietzsche answers that the idea of anything intransitory is a mere symbol, and God (the idea of anything eternal) a poet's lie.

Like a mocking-bird, the nominalist philosopher imitates the ring of Goethe's lines, saying:

"Das Unvergängliche
Ist nur dein Gleichniss.
Gott der Verfängliche
Ist Dichter-Erschleichniss.
Weltspiel, das herrische,
Mischt Sein und Schein :—
Das Ewig-Närrische
Mischt uns—hinein."

¹*La Gaya Scienza*, German edition, p. 154; and *passim* in *Menschliches*, etc.

Nietzsche does not believe in truth: "There is probability, but no truth," says he in *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten*, p. 190; and he adds concerning the measure of the value of truth (*ibid.*, Aphorism 4):

"The trouble of ascending mountains is no measure of their height, and should it be different in Science?"

It is true that such words as *long* and *short* are relative, because dependent on subjective needs and valuations. But must we for that reason give up all hope of describing facts in objective terms? Are not metres and foot-measures definite magnitudes, whether or not they be *long* for one purpose and *short* for another? Relativity itself admits of a description in objective terms; and if a statement of facts in objective terms were impossible, the ideals of exact science (as all ideals) would be a dream.

That Nietzsche prefers the abrupt style of aphorisms to dispassionate inquiries is a symptom that betrays the nature of his philosophy.

While Nietzsche's philosophy is in itself inconsistent and illogical, it is yet born of the logic of facts; it is the consistent result and legitimate conclusion of principles which have been uttered centuries ago and have slowly matured in the historical development of human thought.

The old nominalistic school is the father of Nietzsche's philosophy. A consistent nominalist will be driven from one conclusion to another until he reaches the stage of Nietzsche which is philosophical anarchism and extreme individualism.

The nominalist denies the reality of reason; he regards the existence of universals as a fiction, and looks upon the world as a heap of particulars. He loses sight of the unity of the world and forgets that form is a true feature of things. It is form and the sameness of the laws of form which makes universality of reason possible.

Nominalism rose in opposition to the mediæval realism of the schoolmen who looked upon universals as real and concrete things, representing them as individual beings that existed *ante res*, *in rebus*, and *post res*, i. e., in the particulars, before them and after them.

The realists were wrong in so far as they conceived universals as substances or distinct essences, supposed to be of a more spiritual nature than material things, but after all concrete existences they were said to have been created by God and served him as models for the creation of things, of which they were deemed to be the prototypes and conditions. The nominalists, on the other hand, went too far also in denying the reality of universals and declaring that universals were mere names (*nomina* and *flatus vocis*), i. e., words invented for the sake of conveniently thinking things and nothing else.

At the bottom of the controversy lies the problem as to the nature of things. The question arises, What are things in themselves? Do things, or do they not, possess an independence of their own? Kant's reply is, that things in themselves cannot be known; but our reply is, that the nature of a thing consists in its form; a thing is such as it is because it has a definite form. Therefore "things in themselves" do not exist; but there are "forms in themselves."

Form is not a non-entity but the most important feature of reality, and the pure laws of form are the determinative factors of the world. The sciences of the laws of pure form, logic, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, etc., are therefore the key to a comprehension of the world, and morality is the realisation of ideals, i. e., of the conceptions of pure forms, which are higher, nobler, and better than those which have been actualised.

From our standpoint, evolution is a process in which the eternal laws of being manifest themselves in a series of regular transformations, reaching a point at which sentiency appears. And then evolution takes the shape of progress, that is to say, sentient beings develop mind; sentiments become sensations, i. e., representative images; and words denote the universals. Then reason originates as a reflex of the eternal laws of pure form. Human reason is deepened in a scientific world-conception, and becoming aware of the moral aspect of universality it broadens out into comprehensive sympathy with all forms of existence that like ourselves aspire after a fuller comprehension of existence.

Thus the personality of man is the reflex of that system of eternalities which sways the universe, and humanity is thus found to be a revelation of the core of the cosmos, an incarnation of Godhood. This revelation, however, is not closed. The appearance of the religions of good-will and mutual sympathy is the beginning merely of a new era, and we may expect that the future of mankind will surpass the present, as much as the present surpasses savagery. That is the higher humanity, the over-man, whom we expect.

Nietzsche's philosophy of "immorality" appears on the horizon of human thought as a unique conception which seems to be ushered into this world without any preparation and without any precedence. It sets itself up against tradition. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's immediate predecessor, regarded history as the desolate dream of mankind, and Nietzsche exhibits a remorseless contempt for everything that comes to us as a product of history. Nietzsche scorns not only law and order, Church and State, but also reason, argument, and rule; he scorns consistency and logic which are regarded as toys for weaklings or as the tools of the crafty.

Nietzsche is a nominalist with a vengeance. His philosophy is particularism carried to extremes. There is no unity of existence to him. The god-idea is dead, not only the old metaphysical notion of a God-individual, but also God in the sense of the ultimate ground of being, the supreme norm of the cosmos. His world is split up into particular selves. He does not ask how they originated; he only knows that they are here. Above all, he knows that his own self is here, and there is no bond of sympathy between his self and other selves. Democracy is an abomination to him, and he despises the gospel of love as it is preached by both Christ and Buddha. This is the key to his anti-moralism and to the doctrine of the autonomy of selfhood.

Nietzsche's philosophy might be called philosophical nihilism, if he did not object to the word. He calls it positivism, but it is particularism, or rather an aristocratic individualism which plays in the domain of thought the same rôle that political nihilism plays in Russia. It is the philosophy of protest, and Nietzsche is conscious

of being a Slav in thought and aspiration. Nor does he forget that his ancestors belonged to the nobility. He claims to have been descended from a Polish nobleman by the name of Niëtzki, a Protestant who came to Germany in the eighteenth century as a religious refugee.¹

He who has faith in truth accepts it as authority; he who accepts truth as authority recognises duty; he who recognises duty beholds a goal of life, he has found a purpose for which life appears worth living; he reaches out beyond the bounds of his narrow individuality into the limitless cosmos. He transcends himself, he grows in truth, he increases in power, he widens in his sympathies.

But, he who rejects truth cuts himself loose from the fountain-head of the waters of life. He may deify selfhood, but his self will die of its own self-apotheosis. His divinity is not a true God-incarnation, it is mere assumption and self-exaltation of a pretender.

Nietzsche's philosophy is more consistent than it appears on its face. Being the negation of the right of consistency, its lack of consistency is its most characteristic feature. If the intellect is truly, as Schopenhauer suggests, the servant of the will, then there is no authority in reason, and arguments have no strength. All quarrels are simply questions of power. Then, there is Might, but not Right; Right is simply the *bon plaisir* of Might. Then there is no good nor evil; good is that which I will, bad is that which threatens to thwart my will. Good and evil are distinctions invented for the enslavement of the masses, but the free man, the genius, the aristocrat, who craftily tramples the masses under foot, knows no difference. He is beyond good and evil.

This, indeed, is the consequence which Nietzsche boldly draws. It is a consistent anarchism, a courageous immoralism, and a proud aristocratism, the ruthless shout of triumph of the victor who hails the doctrine of the survival of the strongest and craftiest as a "joyful science."

¹ Nietzsche's love of Slavism manifested itself in his childhood, for when the news of the fall of Sebastopol became known, Nietzsche, at that time a mere boy was so dejected that he could not eat and gave expression to his chagrin in mournful strains of verse.

Nietzsche would not refute the arguments of those who differ from him; for refutation of other views does not befit a positive mind who posits his own truth. "What have I to do with refutations," exclaims Nietzsche in the Preface to his *Genealogy of Morals*. The self is lord. There is no law for the lord, and so he denounces the ethics of Christianity as slave-morality, and preaches the lord-morality of the strong which is self-assertion.

Morality itself is denounced by Nietzsche as immoral. Morality is the result of evolution, and man's moral ideals are products of conditions climatic, social, economical, national, religious, and what not. Why should we submit to the tyranny of a rule which after all proves to be a relic of barbarism? Nietzsche rejects morality as incompatible with the sovereignty of selfhood, and, pronouncing our former judgment a superstition, he proposes "a transvaluation of all values." The self must be established as supreme ruler, and therefore all rules, maxims, principles, must go, for the very convictions of a man are mere chains that fetter the freedom of his soul.

A PHILOSOPHY OF ORIGINALITY.

Nietzsche accepts the truth of evolution, but he does so for the purpose of protesting against that which exists, as having no right of existence, being the mere incidental product of a development.¹ He believes in evolution and in the higher condition of future progress, but instead of working for a development of the better from the best of the present, which is the method of nature, he shows his contempt for the human and all-too-human, he prophesies a deluge and hopes that from its floods the over-man will emerge whose seal of superiority will be the strength of the conqueror that enables him to survive in the struggle for existence.

Nietzsche has looked deeply into the apparent chaos of life

¹ One would expect that Nietzsche, being a most one-sided Darwinist who believes in the struggle for life, red in tooth and claw, would look up to Darwin as his master. But Nietzsche recognises no master, and he emphasises this by speaking in his poetry of Darwin as "this English joker," whose "mediocre reasons are accepted for philosophy." See Nietzsche's poems in the appendix to *A Genealogy of Morals*, Eng. ed., p. 248.


that according to Darwin is a ruthless struggle for survival. He avoids the mistake of those sentimentalists who believe that goody-goodyness can rule the world, who underrate the worth of courage at the expense of humility, and who would venture to establish peace on earth by grounding arms. He sees the differences that exist between all things, the antagonism that obtains everywhere, and preferring to play the part of the hammer, he showers expressions of contempt upon the anvil.

And Nietzsche's self-assertion is immediate and direct. He does not pause to consider what his self is or how it originated. He takes it as it is and opposes it to the authority of other powers, the State, the Church, and the traditions of the past. An investigation of the nature of the self might have dispelled the illusion of his self-glorification, but he never thinks of analysing its constitution. Bluntly and without any reflexion or deliberation he claims the right of the sovereignty of self. He seems to forget that there are different selves, and that what we need most is a standard by which we can gauge their respective worth, and not an assertion of the rights of the self in general.

We do not intend to quarrel with Nietzsche's radicalism. Nor do we underrate the significance of the self. We, too, believe that every self has the liberty to choose its own position and may claim as many rights as it pleases. If it cannot maintain them it will be crushed; otherwise it may conquer its rivals and suppress counter-claims; but therefore the wise man looks before he leaps. Reckless self-assertion is the method of brute creation. Neither the lion nor the lamb meditate on their fate; they simply follow their instincts. They are carnivorous or herbivorous by nature through the karma of their ancestors. Man's karma, however, leads higher. Man can meditate on his own fate, and he can discriminate. His self is a personality, i. e., a self-controlled commonwealth of motor ideas. Man does not blindly follow his impulses but establishes rules of action. He thus can abbreviate the struggle and avoid unnecessary friction; he can rise from brute violence to a self-contained and well-disciplined strength. Self-control (i. e., ethical guidance) is the characteristic feature of the true "over-man"; but

Nietzsche knows nothing of self-control; he would allow the self blindly to assert itself after the fashion of animal instincts.

Nietzsche is the philosopher of instinct. He spurns all logical order, even truth itself. He has a contempt for every one who



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learns from others, for he regards them as slaves to other people's thought. He says in his motto to the second edition of his *Gay Science*:

"Ich wohne in meinem eignen Haus,
Hab' niemandem nie nichts nachgemacht

Und—lachte noch jeden Meister aus,
Der nicht sich selber ausgelacht."¹

We wonder that Nietzsche did not think of Goethe's little rhyme, which seems to suit his case exactly:

"A fellow says: 'I own no school or college;
No master lives whom I acknowledge;
And pray don't entertain the thought
That from the dead I e'er learnt aught.'
This, if I rightly understand,
Means: 'I'm a fool by own command.'"

Nietzsche observes that the thoughts of most philosophers are secretly guided by instincts. He feels that all thought is at bottom a "will for power," and the will for truth has no right to exist except it serve the will for power. He reproaches philosophers for glorifying truth.

Fichte in his *Duties of the Scholar* says:

"My life and my fate are nothing; but the results of my life are of great importance. I am a priest of Truth; I am in the service of Truth; I feel under obligation to do, to risk, and to suffer anything for truth."

Nietzsche declares that this is shallow. Will for truth, he says, should be called "will to make being thinkable." Here, it seems to us, Nietzsche simply replaces the word "truth" by one of its functions. Truth is a systematic representation of reality, a comprehensive description of facts; the result being that "existence is made thinkable."

Nietzsche is in a certain sense right when he says that truth in itself is nothing; for every representation of reality must serve a purpose, otherwise it is superfluous and useless. And the purpose of truth is the furtherance of life. Nietzsche instinctively hits the right thing in saying that at the bottom of philosophy there is the will for power. In spite of our school-philosophers' vain declamations of "science for its own sake," genuine philosophy will never be anything else than a method for the acquisition of power. But this method is truth. Nietzsche errs when he declares that "the

¹ "I live in my own house, have never imitated anybody, and have always laughed at every master who has not laughed at himself."

head is merely the intestine of the heart." The head endeavors to find out the truth, and the truth is not purely subjective. It is true that truth is no good to a man unless he makes it his own ; he must possess it ; it must be part of himself, but he cannot create it. Truth cannot be made ; it must be discovered. Since the scholar's specialised business is the elucidation of the method of discovering the truth, not its purpose, not its application in practical life, Fichte's ideal of the aim of scholarship remains justified.

Omit the ideal of truth in a philosophy, and it becomes an *ignis fatuus*, a will-o'-the-wisp, that will lead people astray. Truth makes existence thinkable, but thinkableness alone is not as yet a test of truth. The ultimate test of truth is its practical application. There is something wrong with a theory that does not work, and thus the self has a master, which is reality, the world in which it lives, with its laws and actualities. The subjective self must measure its worth by the objective standard of truth,—to be obtained through exact inquiry and scientific investigation.

The will for power, in order to succeed, must be clarified by a methodical comprehension of facts and conditions. The contradictory impulses in our own self must be systematised so that they would not collide and mutually annihilate themselves ; and the comprehension of this orderly disposition is called reason.

Nietzsche is on the right track when he ridicules such ideals as "virtue for the sake of virtue," and even "truth for the sake of truth." Virtue and truth are for the sake of life. They have not their purpose in themselves, but their nature consists in serving the expanse and further growth of the human soul. This is a truth which we have always insisted upon and which becomes apparent when those people who speak of virtue for its own sake try to define virtue, or determine the ultimate standard of right and wrong, of goodness and badness. We say, that that which enhances soul-growth, thus producing higher life and begetting a superior humanity, is good ; while that which cripples or retards those aspirations is bad. Further, truth is not holy in itself. It becomes holy in the measure that it serves man's holiest aspirations. We sometimes meet among scientists, and especially among philologists, men who

with the ideal of "truth for the sake of truth" pursue some very trivial investigations, such, for example, as the use of the accusative after certain prepositions in Greek, or how often Homer is guilty of a hiatus. They resemble Wagner, whom Faust characterises as :

" . . . a fool whose choice is
 To stick in shallow trash for ever more,
 Who digs with eager hand for buried ore,
 And when he finds an earthworm he rejoices."

Thus there are many trivial truths which are indifferent and the investigation of which is of no account. For instance, whether the correct pronunciation of the Greek letter η was *ee* or *ay* need not concern us much, and the philologist who devotes to its settlement all his life and his best strength is rather to be pitied than admired. Various truths are very different in value, for life and truth become holy according to their importance. All this granted, we need not, with Nietzsche, discard truth, reason, virtue, and all moral aspirations.

Nietzsche apparently is under the illusion that reason, systematic thought, the moral discipline, self-control, are external powers, and in his love of liberty he objects to their authority. Did he ever consider that thought is not an external agent, but a clarification of man's instincts, and that discipline is, or at least in its purpose and final aim ought to be, self-regulation, so that our contradictory thoughts would not wage an internecine war? Thus, Nietzsche, the instinct-philosopher, appears as an ingenious boy whose very immaturity is regarded by himself as the highest blossom of his existence. Like an intoxicated youth, he revels in his irresponsibility and laughs at the man who has learned to take life seriously. Because the love of truth originates from instincts, Nietzsche treats it as a mere instinct, and nothing else. He forgets that in the evolution of man's soul all instincts develop into something higher than instinct, and the love of truth develops into systematic science.

Nietzsche never investigated what his self consists of. He never analysed his individuality. Otherwise he would have learned

that he has received the most valuable part of his being from others, and that that bundle of instincts which he calls his sovereign self is nothing but the inherited heirloom of the ages that have preceded him. In spite of his repudiation of owing anything to others, he is but the continuation of others. But he boldly carries his individualism, if not to its logical conclusions, yet to its moral applications. When speaking of the Order of Assassins of the times of the Crusades, he says with enthusiasm: "The highest secrecy of their leaders was, 'Nothing is true, everything is allowed!'" And Nietzsche adds: "Indeed, that was liberty of spirit, that dismissed even the belief in truth." The philosopher of instinct regards even the adhesion to truth as slavery and the proclamation of truth as dogmatism.

NIETZSCHE'S ZARATHUSTRA.

To those who have not the time to wade through the twelve volumes of Nietzsche's works and yet wish to become acquainted with him as he is at his best, we recommend a perusal of his book *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, which is original and interesting, full of striking passages, sometimes flashes of deep truths, then again sterile and unprofitable, or even tedious, and sometimes absurd; but which at any rate presents the embodiment of Nietzsche's grandest thoughts in their most attractive and characteristic form. We need scarcely warn the reader that Zarathustra is only another name for Friedrich Nietzsche and has nothing to do with the historical person of that name, the great Iranian prophet, the founder of Mazdaism.

The quintessence of Nietzsche's philosophy is the "over-man." What is the over-man?

The word *Uebermensch* comes from a good mint; it is of Goethe's coinage and served to characterise Faust, the titanic man of high aims and undaunted courage,—the man who would not budge in the presence of hell and pursued his aspirations in spite of the forbidding countenance of God and the ugly grin of Satan. Alexander Tille, the English translator of Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, translates the word *Uebermensch* by "beyond-man,"

but beyond means *jenseits*; and Nietzsche wrote *über*, i. e., superior to, over, or higher than, and the literal translation "over-man" appears to be the best. Emerson in a similar vein, when attempting to characterise that which is higher than the soul, invented the term "oversoul," and I can see no objection to the word "over-man."

The over-man is the higher man, the superhuman man of the future, a higher, nobler, more powerful, a better being than the present man! What a splendid idea! Since evolution has been accepted as a truth, we may fairly trust that we all, at least all evolutionists, believe in the over-man. All our reformers believe in the possibility of realising a higher mankind. We Americans especially have faith in the coming of the kingdom of the over-man, and our endeavor is concentrated in hastening his arrival. The question is only, What is the over-man and how can we make this ideal of a higher development actual?

Happy Nietzsche! You need not trouble yourself about consistency. You reject all ideals as superstitions, and then introduce an ideal of your own. "There you see," says an admirer of Nietzsche, "what a splendid principle it is not to own any allegiance to logic, or rule, or consistency. The best thought of Nietzsche's would never have been uttered if he had remained faithful to his own principles."

However ingenious the idea of an over-man may be, Nietzsche carries his propositions to such extremes that in spite of many flashes of truth they become in the end ridiculous and even absurd.

Nietzsche's ideal is good, but he utterly fails to comprehend its nature and also the mode in which alone the over-man can be realised.

Nietzsche's Zarathustra is a hermit philosopher who, weary of his wisdom, leaves his cave and comes to mingle with men, to teach them the over-man. He meets a saint who loves God, and Zarathustra leaving him says: "Is it possible? This old saint in his forest has not yet heard that God is dead!"

In a town Zarathustra preaches to a crowd in the market:

"I teach you the over-man. Man is a something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him ?

"All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves : and are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the animal than surpass man ?

"What with man is the ape ? A joke or a sore shame. Man shall be the same for the over-man, a joke or a sore shame.

"Behold, I teach you the over-man !

"The over-man is the significance of the earth. Your will shall say : the over-man shall be the significance of the earth.

"I conjure you, my brethren, remain faithful to the earth and do not believe those who speak unto you of superterrestrial hopes ! Poisoners they are whether they know it or not.

"Verily, a muddy stream is man. One must be the ocean to be able to receive a muddy stream without becoming unclean.

"Behold, I teach you the over-man : he is that ocean, in him your great contempt can sink.

"What is the greatest thing ye can experience ? That is the hour of great contempt. The hour in which not only your happiness, but your reason and virtue as well, turn loathsome.

"I love him who is of a free spirit and of a free heart : thus his head is merely the intestine of his heart, but his heart driveth him to destruction.

"I love all those who are like heavy drops falling one by one from the dark cloud lowering over men : they announce the coming of the lightning and perish in the announcing.

"Behold, I am an announcer of the lightning and a heavy drop from the clouds : that lightning's name is the over-man."

Zarathustra comes as an enemy of the good and the just. He says :

"Lo, the good and just ! Whom do they hate most ? Him who breaketh to pieces their tables of values,—the law-breaker, the criminal :—but he is the creator.

"The destroyer of moral I am called by the good and just : my tale is immoral."

Zarathustra's philosophy is a combination of the eagle's pride and the serpent's wisdom, which Nietzsche describes thus :

"Lo ! an eagle swept through the air in wide circles, a serpent hanging from it not like a prey, but like a friend : coiling round its neck.

" ' They are mine animals,' said Zarathustra, and rejoiced heartily.

"The proudest animal under the sun, and the wisest animal under the sun have set out to reconnoitre.

"They wished to learn whether Zarathustra still liveth. Verily, do I still live.

"More dangerous than among animals I found it among men. Dangerous ways are taken by Zarathustra. Let mine animals lead me!"

Here is a sentence worth quoting :

"Of all that is written I love only that which the writer wrote with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt learn that blood is spirit."

In another chapter on the back-worlds-men Nietzsche writes :

"Once Zarathustra threw his spell beyond man, like all back-worlds-men. Then the world seemed to me the work of a suffering and tortured God.

"Alas! brethren, that God whom I created was man's work and man's madness, like all Gods!

"Man he was, and but a poor piece of man and the I. From mine own ashes and flame it came unto me, that ghost, yea verily! It did not come unto me from beyond!

"What happened, brethren? I overcame myself, the sufferer, and carrying mine own ashes unto the mountains invented for myself a brighter flame. And lo! the ghost departed from me!

"Now to me, the convalescent, it would be suffering and pain to believe in such ghosts: suffering it were now for me and humiliation. Thus I speak unto the back-worlds-men."

Nietzsche's self is not ideal but material; it is not thought, not even the will, but the body. The following passage sounds like Vedantism as interpreted by a materialist:

"He who is awake and knoweth saith: body I am throughout, and nothing besides; and soul is merely a word for a something in body.

"Body is one great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a flock and a herdsman.

"Also thy little reason, my brother, which thou callest 'spirit'—it is a tool of thy body, a little tool and toy of thy great reason.

"'I' thou sayest and art proud of that word. But the greater thing is—which thou wilt not believe—thy body and its great reason. It doth not say 'I,' but it is the acting 'I.'

"The self ever listeneth and seeketh: it compareth, subdueth, conquereth, destroyeth. It ruleth and is the ruler of the 'I' as well.

"Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, standeth a mighty lord, an unknown wise man—whose name is self. In thy body he dwelleth, thy body he is.

"There is more reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom. And who can know why thy body needeth thy best wisdom?

"Thy self laugheth at thine I and its prancings: What are these boundings

and flights of thought? it saith unto itself. A round-about way to my purpose. I am the leading-string of the I and the suggester of its concepts.

"The creative self created for itself valuing and despising, it created for itself lust and woe. The creative body created for itself the spirit to be the hand of its will."

One of the best passages in Zarathustra's sermons is Nietzsche's command to love the over-man, the man of the distant future:

"I tell you, your love of your neighbor is your bad love of yourselves.

"Ye flee from yourselves unto your neighbor and would fain make a virtue thereof; but I see through your 'unselfishness.'

"The thou is older than the I; the thou hath been proclaimed holy, but the I not yet; man thus thrusteth himself upon his neighbor.

"Do I counsel you to love your neighbor? I rather counsel you to flee from your neighbor and to love the most remote.

"Love unto the most remote future man is higher than love unto your neighbor. And I consider love unto things and ghosts to be higher than love unto men,

"This ghost which marcheth before thee, my brother, is more beautiful than thou art. Why dost thou not give him thy flesh and thy bones? Thou art afraid and fleest unto thy neighbor.

"Unable to endure yourselves and not loving yourselves enough: you seek to wheedle your neighbor into loving you and thus to gild you with his error.

"My brethren, I counsel you not to love your neighbor, I counsel you to love those who are the most remote."

In perfect agreement with the ideal of the over-man is Nietzsche's view of marriage:

"Thou shalt build beyond thyself. But first thou must be built thyself square in body and soul.

"Thou shalt not only propagate thyself but propagate thyself upwards! Therefore the garden of marriage may help thee!

"Thou shalt create a higher body, a prime motor, a wheel of self-rolling,—thou shalt create a creator.

"Marriage: thus I call the will of two to create that one which is more than they who created it. I call marriage reverence unto each other as unto those who will such a will.

"Let this be the significance and the truth of thy marriage. But that which the much-too-many call marriage, those superfluous—alas, what call I that?

"Alas! that soul's poverty of two! Alas! that soul's dirt of two! Alas! that miserable ease of two!

"Marriage they call that; and they say marriage is made in heaven.

"Well, I like it not, that heaven of the superfluous!"

Nietzsche takes a Schopenhauerian view of womankind, excepting from the common condemnation his sister alone, to whom he once said, "You are not a woman, you are a friend." He says of woman :

"Too long a slave and a tyrant have been hidden in woman. Therefore woman is not yet capable of friendship : she knoweth love only."

Nietzsche is not aware that his self changes and that it grows by the acquisition of truth. He treats the self as remaining the same, and truth as that which our will has made conceivable. Truth to him is a mere creature of the self. Here is Zarathustra's condemnation of man's search for truth :

" 'Will unto truth ' ye call, ye wisest men, what inspireth you and maketh you ardent ?

" 'Will unto the conceivableness of all that is,'—thus I call your will !

"All that is ye are going to *make* conceivable. For with good mistrust ye doubt whether it is conceivable.

"But it hath to submit itself and bend before yourselves ! Thus your will willeth. Smooth it shall become and subject unto spirit as its mirror and reflected image.

"That is your entire will, ye wisest men, as a will unto power ; even when ye speak of good and evil and of valuations.

"Ye will create the world before which to kneel down. Thus it is your last hope and drunkenness."

Recognition of truth is regarded as submission :

"To be true,—few are able to be so ! And he who is able doth not want to be so. But least of all the good are able.

"Oh, these good ! *Good men never speak the truth.* To be good in that way is a sickness for the mind.

"They yield, these good, they submit themselves ; their heart saith what is said unto it, their foundation obeyeth. But whoever obeyeth doth not hear *himself* !"

Nietzsche despises science. He must have had sorry experiences with scientists who offered him the dry bones of scholarship as scientific truth.

"When I lay sleeping, a sheep ate at the ivy-wreath of my head,—ate and said eating : ' Zarathustra is no longer a scholar.'"

"Said it and went off clumsily and proudly. So a child told me.

"This is the truth : I have departed from the house of scholars, and the door I have shut violently behind me.

"Too long sat my soul hungry at their table. Not, as they, am I trained for perceiving as for cracking nuts.

"Freedom I love, and a breeze over a fresh soil. And I would rather sleep on ox-skins than on their honors and respectabilities.

"I am too hot and am burnt with mine own thoughts, so as often to take my breath away. Then I must go into the open air and away from all dusty rooms.

"Like millworks they work, and like corn-crushers. Let folk only throw their grain into them ! They know only too well how to grind corn and make white dust out of it.

"They look well at each other's fingers and trust each other not over-much. Ingenious in little stratagems, they wait for those whose knowledge walketh on lame feet ; like spiders they wait.

"They also know how to play with false dice ; and I found them play so eagerly that they perspired from it.

"We are strangers unto each other, and their virtues are still more contrary unto my taste than their falsehoods and false dice."

Even if all scientists were puny sciolists, the ideal of science would remain, and if all the professed seekers for truth were faithless to and unworthy of their high calling, truth itself would not be abolished.

So far as we can see, Nietzsche never became acquainted with any one of the exact sciences. He was a philologist who felt greatly dissatisfied with the loose methods of his colleagues, but he has not done much in his own specialty to attain to a greater exactness of results. His essays on Homer, on the Greek tragedy, and similar subjects, have apparently not received much recognition among philologists and historians.

Having gathered a number of followers in his cave, one of them, called the conscientious man, said to the others :

"We seek different things, even up here, ye and I. For I seek more security. Therefore have I come unto Zarathustra. For he is the firmest tower and will—

"Fear—that is man's hereditary and fundamental feeling. By fear everything is explained, original sin and original virtue. Out of fear also hath grown *my* virtue, which is called Science.

"Such long, old fears, at last become refined, spiritual, intellectual, to-day, methinketh, it is called *Science*."

This conception of science is refuted by Nietzsche in this fashion:

"Thus spake the conscientious one. But Zarathustra who had just returned into his cave and had heard the last speech and guessed its sense, threw a handful of roses at the conscientious one, laughing at his 'truths.' 'What?' he called 'What did I hear just now? Verily, methinketh, thou art a fool, or I am one myself. And thy "truth" I turn upside down with one blow, and that quickly.

Of Mummy! Grief Grief!
 Was I grief in this Mummy?
 " Of grief, of grief—
 " In this dream in it—
 " In this in it,
 " And this is the day of death.
 " Grief is in this—
 " Lief—this is all for death:
 " Of grief: Vorseuf!
 " Of all Lief will (mischief)—
 " — will this, this (mischief)!"

NIETZSCHE'S HANDWRITING.

A poem from *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

"For fear is our exception. But courage and adventure, and the joy of what is uncertain, what hath never been dared—courage, methinketh, is the whole prehistoric development of man.

"From the wildest, most courageous beasts he hath, by his envy and his preying, won all their virtues. Only thus hath he become a man.

"This courage, at last become refined, spiritual, intellectual, this human courage with an eagle's wings and a serpent's wisdom—it, methinketh, is called to-day—

"Zarathustra!" cried all who sat together there, as from one mouth, making a great laughter withal."

In spite of identifying his self with the body, who is mortal, Nietzsche longs for the immortal. He says:

"Oh! how could I fail to be eager for eternity, and for the marriage-ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?"

"Never yet have I found the woman by whom I should have liked to have children, unless it be this woman I love. For I love thee, O Eternity!"

A PROTEST AGAINST HIMSELF.

Nietzsche's philosophy forms a strange contrast to his own habits of life. Himself a model of virtue, he made himself the ad-



AS A PUPIL OF SCHULPFORTA.
1861.



AS A VOLUNTEER IN THE GERMAN
ARTILLERY. 1868.

vocate of vice, and gloried in it. He encouraged the robber¹ to rob, but he himself was honesty incarnate; he incited the people to rebel against authority of all kinds, but he himself was a "model child" in the nursery, a "model scholar" in school, and a "model soldier" while serving in the German army. His teachers as well

¹E. g.: "Bitte nie! Lass dies Gewimmer!
Nimm, ich bitte dich, nimm immer!"

as the officers of his regiment find not words enough *to praise Nietzsche's obedience*.¹

Nietzsche disclaims having learnt anything in any school, but there was never a more grateful German disciple. He composed fervid poems on his school—the well-known institution *Schulpforta*, which on account of its severe discipline he praises, not in irony but seriously, as the “narrow gate.”²

Nietzsche denounces the German character, German institutions, and the German language, his mother-tongue; he is extremely unfair in his denunciations,³ but he not only writes in German and makes the most involved constructions, but when the war broke out he asks his adopted country Switzerland, in which he had ac-

¹ Compare *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches* by his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Nietzsche's professors declare that he distinguished himself “*durch pünktlichen Gehorsam*” (p. 3); his sister tells us that she and her brother were “*ungeheuer artig, wahre Musterkinder*” (p. 36). He makes a good soldier, and, in spite of his denunciations of posing, displays theatrical vanity in having himself photographed with drawn sword (the scabbard is missing). His martial mustache almost anticipates the tonsorial art of the imperial barber of the present Kaiser; and yet his spectacled eyes and good-natured features betray the peacefulness of his intentions. He plays the soldier only, and would have found difficulty in killing even a fly.

² *Leben*, pp. 90-97

³ Nietzsche enjoys it that *Deutsch* (see Ulfila's Bible translation) originally means “pagans or heathen,” and hopes that the dear German people will earn the honor of being called pagans. (*La Gaya Scienza*, p. 176.) A reaction against his patriotism sets in immediately after the war, when he became acquainted with the brutality of some vulgar specimens of the victorious nation,—most of them non-combatants. (See, e. g., *Leben*, II., 1, pp. 108-111.) “Nach dem Kriege missfiel mir der Luxus, die Franzosenverachtung,” etc., p. 108. “Ich halte das jetzige Preussen für eine der Cultur höchst gefährliche Macht.” Nietzsche ridicules German as barbarous in sound (*La Gaya Scienza*, pp. 138-140), “wälderhaft, heiser, wie aus räucherigen Stuben und unhöflichen Gegenden.” Unique is the origin of the standard style of modern high German from the bureaucratic slang, “kanzleimässig schreiben, das war etwas Vornehmen” (*La Gaya Scienza*, p. 138), and at present the German changes into an “Offizierdeutsch” (*ibid.*, p. 139). Nietzsche suspects “the German depth,” “die deutsche Tiefe,” to be a mere mental dyspepsia (see “Jenseits von Gut und Böse,” p. 211), saying, “Der Deutsche verdaut seine Ereignisse schlecht, er wird nie damit fertig; die deutsche Tiefe ist oft nur eine schwere, zögernde Verdauung.” Nevertheless, he holds that the old-fashioned German depth is better than modern Prussian “Schneidigkeit und Berliner Witz und Sand.” He prefers the company of the Swiss to that of his countrymen. (See also “Was den Deutschen abgeht,” Vol. 8, p. 108.)

quired citizenship after accepting a position as professor of classical languages at the University of Basel, for leave of absence to join the German army. He might have had a chance in the Franco-Prussian war to live up to his theories of struggle, but unfortunately the Swiss authorities did not allow him to join the army, and granted leave of absence only on the condition that he would serve as a nurse. Such is the irony of fate. While Nietzsche stood up for a ruthless assertion of strength and for a suppression of sympathy which he denounced as a relic of the ethics of a negation of life, his own tender soul was so over-sensitive that his sister feels justified in tracing his disease back to the terrible impressions he received during the war.

Nietzsche speaks of the king as "the dear father of the country."¹ If there was a flaw in Nietzsche's moral character, it was goody-goodyness; and his philosophy is a protest against the principles of his own nature. While boldly calling himself "the first immoralist," justifying even licence itself and defending the coarsest lust,² his own life was as pure as that of a virgin, and he shrunk back in disgust from moral filth whenever he met with it in practical life.

Nietzsche denounced pessimism, and yet his philosophy was, as he himself confesses, the last consequence of pessimism. Hegel declared (says Nietzsche in *Morgenröthe*, p. 8), "Contradiction moves the world, all things are self-contradictory;" "we (adds Nietzsche) carry Pessimism even into logic." He proposes to vivisect morality; "but (adds he) you cannot vivisect a thing without killing it." Thus his "immoralism" is simply an expression of his earnestness to investigate the moral problem, and he expresses the result in this terse sentence: "Moral ist Nothlüge." (*Menschliches*, p. 63.)

¹ "Unser lieber König," "der Landesvater," etc. See *Leben*, I., p. 24, and II., 1, p. 248, "Unser lieber alter Kaiser Wilhelm" and "wir Preussen waren wirklich stolz." These expressions occur in Nietzsche's description of the Emperor's appearance at Bayreuth.

² E. g., "Auch der schädlichste Mensch ist vielleicht immer noch der aller-nützlichste in Hinsicht auf Erhaltung der Art," etc. *La Gaya Scienza*, p. 3 ff.

He preached struggle and hatred, and yet was so tender-hearted that in an hour of dejection he confessed to his sister with a sigh :

"Ich bin so gar nicht zum Hassen und zum Feind sein gemacht !"

Poor Nietzsche ! what a bundle of contradictions ! None of these contradictions are inexplicable. All of them are quite natural. They are the inevitable reactions against a prior enthusiasm, and he swings, according to the law of the pendulum, to the opposite extreme of his former position.


How did Nietzsche develop into an Immoralist ? Simply by way of reaction against the influence of Schopenhauer in combination with the traditional Christianity. Schopenhauer was the master at whose feet Nietzsche sat ; he learned from Schopenhauer boldness of thought and atheism ; he accepted for a time his pessimism, but rebelled in his inmost soul against the ethical doctrine of the negation of the will. He thus recognised the reactionary spirit of Schopenhauer, whose system is a Christian metaphysics. Nietzsche denounces the ethics of a negation of the will as a disease, and since nature in the old system is regarded as the source of moral evil the idea dawns on him that he himself, trying to establish a philosophy of nature, is an immoralist. He now questions morality itself from the standpoint of an affirmation of the will, and at last goes so far as to speak of ideals as a symptom of shallowness.¹

Nietzsche must not be taken too seriously. He was engaged with the deepest problems of life, and published his sentiments as to their solution before he had actually attempted to investigate them. He criticises and attacks like the Irishman who hits a head wherever he sees it. Here are the first three rules of his philosophical warfare :

"First : I attack only those causes which are victorious, sometimes I wait till they are victorious. Secondly : I attack them only when I would find no allies,

¹ See, e. g., *Leben*, I., p. 135, where he speaks of a new "Freigeisterei," denouncing the "libres penseurs" as "unverbesserliche Flachköpfe und Hanswürste," adding, "Sie glauben allesammt noch an's 'Ideal.'"

when I stand isolated, when I compromise myself alone. Thirdly: I have never taken a step in public which did not compromise me. That is my criterion of right action."



THE LATEST PICTURE. After an oil-painting by C. Stoeving.

A man who adopts this strange criterion of right conduct must produce a strange philosophy. His soul is in an uproar against itself. Says Nietzsche in his *Götzendämmerung*, Aphorism 45:

"Almost every genius knows as one phase of his development the 'Catilinary existence,' so called, which is a feeling of hatred, of vengeance, of revolution against everything that is, which no longer needs to become . . . Catilina—the form of Cæsar's pre-existence."

Nietzsche changed his views during his life-time, and the Immoralist Nietzsche originated in contradiction to his habitual moralism. He is a man of extremes. As soon as a new thought dawns on him, it takes possession of his soul to the exclusion of his prior views, and his latter self contradicts his former self.

Nietzsche says :

"The serpent that cannot slough must die. In the same way, the spirits which are prevented from changing their opinions cease to be spirits."

So we must expect that if Nietzsche had been permitted to continue longer in health, he would have cast off the slough of his Immoralism and the negative conceptions of his positivism. His *Zarathustra* was the last work of his pen, but it is only the most classical expression of the fermentation of his soul, not the final purified result of his philosophy ; it is not the solution of the problem that stirred his heart.

While writing his *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, Nietzsche characterises his method of work thus :

"That I proceed with my outpourings considerably like a dilettante and in an immature manner, I know very well, but I am anxious first of all to get rid of the whole polemico-negative material. I wish undisturbedly to sing off, up and down and truly dastardly, the whole gamut of my hostile feelings, 'that the vaults shall echo back.'¹ Later on, i. e., within five years, I shall discard all polemics and bethink myself of a really 'good work.' But at present my breast is oppressed with disgust and tribulation. I must expectorate, decorously or indecorously, but radically and for good" [*endgültig*].

The very immaturity of Nietzsche's view becomes attractive to immature minds. He wrote while his thoughts were still in a state of fermentation, and he died before the wine of his soul was clarified.

¹ "Dass das Gewölbe wiederhallt,"—a quotation from Goethe's "Faust."

ANOTHER NIETZSCHE.

The assertion of selfhood and the hankering after originality make Nietzsche the exponent of the absolute uniqueness of everything particular, and he goes to the extreme of denying all kinds of universality—even that of formal laws (the so-called uniformities of nature), reason, and especially its application in the field of practical life, morality. His ideal is “Be thyself! Be unique! Be original!” Properly speaking, we should not use the term ideal when speaking of Nietzsche’s maxims of life, for the conception of an ideal is based upon a recognition of some kind of universality, and Nietzsche actually sneers at any one having ideals. The adherents of Nietzsche speak of their master as “*der Einzige*,” i. e., “the unique one,” and yet (in spite of the truth that every thing particular is in its way unique) the uniformities of nature are so real and unfailing that Nietzsche is simply the representative of a type which according to the laws of history and mental evolution naturally and inevitably appears whenever the philosophy of nominalism reaches its climax. He would therefore not be unique even if he were the only one that aspires after a unique selfhood; but the fact is that there are a number of Nietzsches, he happening to be the best known of his type. Other advocates of selfhood, of course, will be different from Nietzsche in many unimportant details, but they will be alike in all points that are essential and characteristic. One of these Nietzsches is George Moore, a Briton who is scarcely familiar with the writings of his German double, but a few quotations from his book, *Confessions of a Young Man*, will show that he can utter thoughts which might have been written by Friedrich Nietzsche himself. George Moore says:

“I was not dissipated, but I loved the abnormal” (p. 18).

“I was a model young man indeed” (p. 20).

“I boasted of dissipations” (p. 19).

“I say again, let general principles be waived; it will suffice for the interest of these pages if it be understood that brain-instincts have always been, and still are, the initial and the determining powers of my being” (p. 47)

George Moore is, like Nietzsche, one of Schopenhauer's disciples who has become sick of pessimism. He says:

"That odious pessimism! How sick I am of it" (p. 310).

When George Moore speaks of God he thinks of him in the old-fashioned way as a big self, an individual and particular being. Hence he denies him. God is as dead as any pagan deity. George Moore says:

"To talk to us, the legitimate children of the nineteenth century, of logical proofs of the existence of God, strikes us in just the same light as the logical proof of the existence of Jupiter Ammon" (p. 137).

George Moore is coarse in comparison with Nietzsche. Nietzsche is no cynic; he is pure-hearted and noble by nature; Moore is voluptuous and vulgar; but both are avowed immoralists, and if the principle of an unrestrained egotism be right, George Moore is as good as Nietzsche, and any criminal given to the most abominable vices would not be worse than either.

Nietzsche feels the decadence of the age and longs for health; but he attributes the cause of his own decadence to the Christian ideals of virtue, love, and sympathy with others. George Moore cherishes the same views; he says:

"We are now in a period of decadence, growing steadily more and more acute" (p. 239).

"Respectability . . . continues to exercise a meretricious and enervating influence on literature" (p. 240).

"Pity, that most vile of all vile virtues, has never been known to me. The great pagan world I love knew it not" (p. 200).

"The philanthropist is the Nero of modern times" (p. 185).

Both Nietzsche and Moore long for limitless freedom; but Moore seems more consistent, for he lacks the ideal of the overman and extends freedom to the sex relation, saying:

"Marriage—what an abomination! Love—yes, but not marriage . . . freedom limitless" (p. 168-169).

Moore loves art, but his view of art is cynical, and here too he is unlike Nietzsche; he says:

"Art is not nature. Art is nature digested. Art is a sublime excrement" (p. 178).

Both believe in the coming of a great social deluge. George Moore says :

"The French revolution will compare with the revolution that is to come, that must come, that is inevitable, as a puddle on the road-side compares with the sea. Men will hang like pears on every lamp-post, in every great quarter of London, there will be an electric guillotine that will decapitate the rich like hogs in Chicago" (p. 343).

Ideals are regarded as superstitions, and belief in ideas is deemed hypocritical. George Moore says :

"In my heart of hearts I think myself a cut above you, because I do not believe in leaving the world better than I found it ; and you, exquisitely hypocritical reader, think that you are a cut above me because you say you would leave the world better than you found it" (p. 354).

The deeds of a man, his thoughts and aspirations, which constitute his spiritual self, count for nothing ; the body alone is supposed to be real, and thus after death a pig is deemed more useful than a Socrates. Continues Moore :

"The pig that is being slaughtered as I write this line will leave the world better than it found it, but you will leave only a putrid carcass fit for nothing but the grave" (p. 353).

Wrong is idealised :

"Injustice we worship ; all that lifts us out of the miseries of life is the sublime fruit of injustice.

"Man would not be man but for injustice" (p. 203).

"Again I say that all we deem sublime in the world's history are acts of injustice ; and it is certain that if mankind does not relinquish at once and for ever, its vain, mad, and frantic dream of justice, the world will lapse into barbarism" (p. 205).

George Moore, giving a moment's thought to the ideal of "a new art, based upon science, in opposition to the art of the old world that was based on imagination, an art that should explain all things and embrace modern life in its entirety, in its endless ramifications, be it, as it were, a new creed in a new civilisation . . . that would continue to a more glorious and legitimate conclusion the work that the prophets have begun ;" but he turns his back upon it. It would be after all a product of development ; it would

be the tyranny of a past age, and he says, "as well drink the dregs of yesterday's champagne" (p. 128).

NIETZSCHE'S DISCIPLES.

Nietzsche's influence is not limited to the professional circle of philosophers; his philosophy begins to play a part in practical life and has taken hold of a number of souls who protest against the social, the political, the religious, and even the scientific, conditions of our civilisation. Nietzsche is the philosopher of protest, and, strange to say, while he himself is aristocratic in his instincts, he appeals most powerfully to the masses of the people. His views act like dynamite upon restless spirits, and he announces himself as the prophet of a great thunder-storm, an upheaval, the outbreak of a volcano.

Nietzsche may make the evolutionist pause, but he appeals only to the revolutionist. His philosophy is the expression of a would-be Cæsar and will therefore be fascinating to all Catilinas.

Nietzsche's disciples are not among the aristocrats, not among the scholars, not among the men of genius. His followers are among the people who believe in hatred and hail him as a prophet of the great deluge. His greatest admirers are anarchists, sometimes also socialists, and above all those geniuses who have failed to find recognition. Nietzsche's thought will prove veritable dynamite if it should happen to reach the masses of mankind, the disinherited, the uneducated, the proletariat, the Catilinary existences. Nietzsche's philosophy is to those whom he despised most, an intoxicant; they see in him their liberator, and their ear feels tickled by his invectives.

Invectives naturally appeal to those who are as unthinking as the brutes of the field, but feel the sufferings of existence as much as do the beasts of burden. They are impervious to argument, but being full of bitterness and envy, they can be led most easily by any kind of denunciations of their betters. Nietzsche hated the masses, the crowd of the common people, the herd. He despised the lowly and had a contempt for the ideals of democracy. Nevertheless, his style of thought is such as to resemble the rant of the leaders of

mobs, and it is quite probable that in the course of time he will become the philosopher of demagogues.

A great number of Nietzsche's disciples share their master's eccentricities and especially his impetuosity. Having a contempt for philosophy as the work of the intellect, they move mainly in the field of political and social self-assertion; they are anarchists who believe that the over-man is coming in labor troubles, strikes, and through a subversion of the authority of government in any form.

The best known German expounders of Nietzsche's philosophy are Max Stirner, Rudolf Steiner, and Alexander Tille.¹ Professor Henri Lichtenberger of the University of Nancy has become his interpreter in France,² and Mr. Erwin McCall, the editor of *The Eagle and the Serpent*, in England.

A periodical *Der Eigene*, i. e., "he who is his own," announces itself as "a journal for all and nobody," and "sounds the slogan of the egoists," by calling on them to "preserve their ownhood." *Der Eigene* proposes to "antagonise all ideals of the brotherhood of man in the religious, ethical, altruistic, social, and communistic fields." It decries monopoly in every form, wages war against all democratic programmes, all aspirations of equality, including charity-maniacs in every form and slumming (*Pöbelbeglückung*); it antagonises bureaucracy and all rules. It does not expect social salvation from the socialistic abolition of private property, but from an unimpeded personal appropriation, the realisation of which appears in a free market and the unconditional *laissez faire, laissez passer*.

¹A. Tille, *Von Darwin bis Nietzsche*. R. Steiner, *Wahrheit und Wissenschaft*; *Die Philosophie der Freiheit*; and *F. Nietzsche, ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit*. M. Stirner, *Der Einzige und seine Eigenschaft*. See also R. Schellwien, *Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche*.

Friedrich Nietzsche's life has been published by the philosopher's sister, Frau E. Förster-Nietzsche. A characterisation, disavowed by Nietzsche's admirers, was written by Frau Lou Andreas Salome, under the title *F. Nietzsche in seinen Werken*. Other works kindred in spirit are Schellwien's *Der Geist der neueren Philosophie*, 95, and *Der Darwinismus*, 96; also Adolf Gerecke, *Die Aussichtslosigkeit des Moralismus*; Schmitt, *An der Grenzscheide zweier Weltalter*; Károly Krausz, *Nietzsche und seine Weltanschauung*.

² Henri Lichtenberger, *La philosophie de Nietzsche*. Paris, Alcan, 1898.

It expects to attain liberty by strengthening the single individual, which is to build up egoistical communities. It repudiates the plan of revolutionising the masses, and the use of violence. It stands up for the pathfinders in literature and art, for personality, for that which is characteristic.

Another anarchistic periodical that stands under the influence of Nietzsche appears in Budapest,¹ Hungary, under the name *Ohne Staat*, i. e., Without Government, as "the organ of ideal anarchists," under the editorship of Karl Krausz,² in German and Hungarian. In England *The Eagle and the Serpent* serves as an exponent of Nietzsche's philosophy. It characterises its own tendency as follows:

"*The Eagle and the Serpent* is a bi-monthly journal of egoistic philosophy and sociology which teaches that in social science altruism spells damnation and egoism spells salvation. In the war against their exploiters the exploited cannot hope to succeed till they act as a unit, an 'ego.'"³

A reader of *The Eagle and the Serpent* humorously criticises the egoistic philosophy as follows:¹

"DEAR EAGLE AND SERPENT,—I am one of those unreasonable persons who see no irreconcilable conflict between egoism and altruism. The altruism of Tol-

¹ Budapest, Hungary, Festung Herrengasse 58.

² Herr Karl Krausz and Dr. Eugen Heinrich Schmitt, the Hungarian editor of *Ohne Staat*, have ceased to work in harmony, since the latter changed the title *Allam nélkül* (i. e., Without State) into *Erőszak nélkül* (i. e., Without Violence), with the subtitle *Közlöny Krisztusi Szellemében* (i. e., An Organ in the Spirit of Christ). Dr. Schmitt believes in peaceful, Christian anarchism, which Herr Krausz regards as self-contradictory.

We may incidentally mention that a contributor to *Ohne Staat* reproduced one of the Homilies of St. Chrysostom, in which he harangues after the fashion of the early Christian preachers against wealth and power. The state's attorney, not versed in Christian patristic literature, seized the issue and placed the man who quoted the old Byzantine saint behind the prison bars. In the November issue (1898) Dr. Schmitt mentions the case and says: "Thus we have an exact and historical proof that the liberty of speech and thought was incomparably greater in miserable, servile Byzantium than it is now in the much more miserable and more servile despotism of modern Europe." Does not Dr. Schmitt overlook the fact that in the days of Byzantine Christianity the saints were protected by the mob, which was much feared by the imperial government and was kept at bay only by a nominal recognition of its claims and beliefs?

³Address: The Eagle and Serpent Publishing Co., 185 Fleet Street, London, England.

stoy is the shortest road to the egoism of Whitman. The unbounded love and compassion of Jesus made him conscious of being the son of God, and that he and the Father were one. Could egoism go further than this? I believe that true egoism and true altruism grow in precisely equal degree in the soul, and that the alleged qualities which bear either name and attempt to masquerade alone without their respective make-weights are shams and counterfeits. The real desideratum is balance, and that cannot be permanently preserved on one leg. However, you skate surprisingly well for the time being on one foot, and I have enjoyed the first performance so well that I enclose 60 cents for a season-ticket.—ERNEST H. CROSBY, Rhinebeck, N. Y., U. S. A."

In America Nietzsche's philosophy is represented by Ragnar Redbeard who published a book entitled *Might is Right, the Survival of the Fittest*.¹ The author characterises his work as follows:

"This book is a reasoned negation of the Ten Commandments—the Golden Rule—the Sermon on the Mount—Republican Principles—Christian Principles—and "Principles" in general.

"It proclaims upon scientific evolutionary grounds, the unlimited absolutism of Might, and asserts that cut-and-dried moral codes are crude and immoral inventions, promotive of vice and vassalage."

Ragnar Redbeard is a most ardent admirer of Nietzsche, as may be learned from his verses made after the pattern of Nietzsche's poetry. Ragnar Redbeard sings:

"There is no 'law' in heaven or earth that man must needs obey! Take what you can, and all you can; and take it while you—may.

"Let not the Jew-born Christ ideal unnerve you in the fight. You have no 'rights,' except alone the rights you win by—might.

"There is no justice, right, nor wrong; no truth, no good, no evil. There is no 'man's immortal soul,' no fiery, fearsome Devil.

"There is no 'heaven of glory.' No!—no 'hell where sinners roast.' There is no 'God the Father,' No!—no Son, no 'Holy Ghost.'

"This world is no Nirvâna where joy forever flows. It is a grewsome butcher shop where dead 'lambs' hang in—rows.

"Man is the most ferocious of all the beasts of prey. He rangeth round the mountains, to love, and feast, and—slay.

"He sails the stormy oceans, he gallops o'er the plains, and sucks the very marrow-bones of captives held in—chains.

"Death endeth all for every man,—for every 'son of thunder'; then be a lion (not a 'lamb') and—don't be trampled under."

¹ Published by Adolph Mueller, 108 Clark street, Chicago.

The latest periodicals in the same line are the *I* (which presumably means "*the big I*"), edited by C. L. Swartz, Wellesley, Mass., and *The Free Comrade*, edited by J. Wm. Lloyd, the author of *A Red Heart in a White World*. In their editorial notes these egoists speak of Elbert Hubbard, editor of *The Philistine*, as one of their own, and as "comrade." The truth is that *The Philistine* calls itself "a periodical of protest," but it protests against unkindness and lack of brotherly sentiment, not against rule and logic. Mr. Hubbard's force lies in his satire, which combines two rare qualities, pointedness and good nature, but if he is anything, he is an altruist by instinct, not an egoist. To use Nietzsche's terminology, we should say that "he is one of those shallow heads who still believe in the ideal."

CONCLUSION.

Nietzsche is unquestionably a bold thinker, a Faust-like questioner, and a Titan among philosophers. He is a man who understands that the problem of all problems is the question, Is there an authority higher than myself? And having discarded belief in God, he finds no authority except pretensions.

Nietzsche apparently is only familiar with the sanctions of morality and the criterion of good and evil as they are represented in the institutions and thoughts established by history, and seeing how frequently they serve as tools in the hands of the crafty for the oppression of the unsophisticated masses of the people, he discards them as utterly worthless. Hence his truly magnificent wrath, his disgust, his contempt for underling-man, this muddy stream of present mankind.

If Nietzsche had dug deeper, he would have found that there is after all a deep significance in moral ideals, for there is an authority above the self by which the worth of the self must be measured. Truth is not a mere creature of the self, but is the comprehension of the immutable eternal laws of being which constitute the norm of existence. Our self, "that creating, willing, valuing 'I,' which (according to Nietzsche) is the measure and value of all things," is

itself measured by that eternal norm of being, the existence of which Nietzsche does not recognise.

Nietzsche is blind to the truth that there is a norm above the self, and that this norm is the source of duty and the object of religion; he therefore denies the very existence of duty, of conviction, of moral principles, of sympathy with the suffering, of authority in any shape, and yet he dares to condemn man in the shape of the present generation of mankind. What right has he, then, to judge the sovereign self of to-day and to announce the coming of a higher self in the over-man? From the principles of his philosophical anarchism he has no right to denounce mankind of to-day, as an underling; for if there is no objective standard of worth, there can be no sense in distinguishing between the under-man of to-day and the over-man of a nobler future.

Nietzsche is a Titan and he is truly Titanic in his rebellion against the smallness of everything that means to be an incarnation of what is great and noble and holy. But he does not protest against the smallness of the representatives of truth and right, he protests against truth and right themselves, and thus he is not merely Titanic, but a genuine Titan,—attempting to take the heavens by storm, a monster, not superhuman but inhuman in proportions, in sentiment and in spirit. Being ingenious, he is, in his way, a genius, but he is not evenly balanced; he is eccentric and, not recognising the authority of reason and science, makes eccentricity his maxim. Thus his grandeur becomes grotesque.

The spirit of negation, the mischief-monger Mephistopheles, says of Faust with reference to his despair of reason and science:

"Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft,
Des Menschen allergrösste Kraft,
So hab' ich dich schon unbedingt."

Being giant-like, the Titan Nietzsche has a sense only for things of large dimensions. He fails to understand the significance of the subtler relations of existence. He is clumsy like Gargantua; he is coarse in his reasoning; he is narrow in his comprehension; his horizon is limited. He sees only the massive effects of the

great dynamical changes brought about by brute force ; he is blind to the quiet and slow but more powerful workings of spiritual forces. The molecular forces that are invisible to the eye transform the world more thoroughly than hurricanes and thunderstorms ; yet the strongest powers are the moral laws, the curses of wrong-doing and oppression, and the blessings of truthfulness, of justice, of good-will. Nietzsche sees them not ; he ignores them. He measures the worth of the over-man solely by his brute force.

If Nietzscheanism were right, the over-man of the future who is going to take possession of the earth will not be nobler and better, wiser and juster than the present man, but more gory, more tiger-like, more relentless, more brutal.

Nietzsche has a truly noble longing for the advent of the over-man, but he throws down the ladder on which man has been climbing up, and thus losing his foothold, he falls down to the place whence mankind started several millenniums ago.

We enjoy the rockets of Nietzsche's genius, we understand his Faust-like disappointment as to the unavailableness of science such as he knew it ; we sympathise with the honesty with which he offered his thoughts to the world ; we recognise the flashes of truth which occur in his sentences, uttered in the tone of a prophet ; but we cannot help condemning his philosophy as unsound in its basis, his errors being the result of an immaturity of comprehension.

Nietzsche has touched upon the problem of problems, but he has not solved it. He weighs the souls of his fellowmen and finds them wanting ; but his own soul is not less deficient. His philosophy is well worth studying, but it is not a good guide through life. It is great only as being the gravest error, boldly, conscientiously, and seriously carried to its utmost extremes and preached as the latest word of wisdom.

It has been customary that man should justify himself before the tribunal of morality, but Nietzsche cites morality itself before his tribunal. Morality justifies herself by calling on truth, but the testimony of truth is ruled out, for truth—objective truth—is denounced as a superstition of the dark ages. Nietzsche knows truth only as a contemptible method of puny spirits to make exist-

ence conceivable,—a hopeless task! Nietzsche therefore finds morality guilty as a usurper and a tyrant, and he exhorts all *esprits forts* to shake off the yoke.

We grant that the self should not be the slave of morality; it should not feel the "ought" as a command; it should identify itself with it and make its requirements the object of his own free will. Good-will on earth will render the law redundant; but when you wipe out the ideal of good-will itself together with its foundation, which is truth and the recognition of truth, the struggle for existence will reappear in its primitive fierceness, and mankind will return to the age of savagery. Let the *esprits forts* of Nietzsche's type try to realise their master's ideal, and their attempts will soon lead to their own perdition.

We read in *Der arme Teufel*,¹ a weekly whose radical editor would not have been prevented by conventional reasons from joining the new fad of Nietzscheanism, the following satirical comment on some modern poet of original selfhood:

" 'I am against matrimony simply because I am a poet. Wife, children, family life,—well, well! they may be good enough for the man possessed of the herding instinct. But I object to trivialities in my own life. I want something stimulating, sensation, poetry! A wife would be prosaic to me, simply on account of being my wife; and children who would call me papa would be disgusting. Poetry I need! Poetry!' Thus he spoke to a friend, and when the latter was gone continued his letter reproaching a waitress for again asking for money and at the same time reflecting upon the purity of her relations to the bartender whom she had said was her cousin only. . . ."

If marriage relations were abolished to-day, would not in the course of time some new form of marriage be established? Those who are too proud to utilise the experiences of past generations, will have to repeat them for themselves and must wade through their follies, sins, errors, and all their penalties.

Nietzsche tries to produce a Cæsar by teaching his followers to imitate the vices of a Catiline; he would raise gods by begetting Titans; he endeavors to give a nobler and better standard to man-

¹ May 13, 1899. Detroit, 949 Gratiot Ave.

kind, not by lifting the people higher and rendering them more efficient, but by making them more pretentious.

If the ethics of Nietzsche were accepted to-day as authoritative, and if people at large acted accordingly, the world would be benefited in one respect, viz., hypocrisy would cease, and the selfishness of mankind would manifest itself in all its nude bestiality. Passions would have full sway; lust, robbery, jealousy, murder, and revenge would increase, and Death in all forms of wild outbursts would reap a richer harvest than he ever did in the days of prehistoric savage life. The result would be a pruning on a grand scale, and after a few bloody decades those only would survive who either by nature or by hypocritical self-control deemed it best to keep the lower passions and the too prurient instincts of their selfhood in proper check, and then the old-fashioned rules of morality, which Nietzsche declared antiquated, would be given a new trial in the new order of things. They might receive another sanction, but they would find recognition.

Nietzsche forgets that the present social order originated from that general free-for-all fight which he commends, and if we begin at the start we should naturally run through the same or a similar course of development to the same or very similar conditions. Will it not be better to go on improving than to revert to the primitive state of savagery?

There are superstitious notions about the nature of the sanction of ethics, but for that reason the moral ideals of mankind remain as firmly established as ever.

The self is not the standard of measurement for good and evil, good and bad, as Nietzsche declares in agreement with the sophists of old; the self is only the condition to which and under which it applies. There is no good and evil in the purely physical world, there is no suffering, no pain, no anguish—all this originates with the rise of organised animal life which is endowed with sentiency; and further there is no goodness and badness, no morality until the animal rises to the height of comprehending the nature of evil. The tiger is in himself neither good nor bad, but he makes himself a cause of suffering to others; and thus he is by them regarded as

bad. Goodness and badness are relative, but for that reason they are not unreal.

It is true that there is no "ought" in the world as an "ought"; nor are there metaphysical ghosts of divine commandments revealing themselves. But man learns the lesson how to avoid evil and reducing it to brief rules which are easily remembered, he calls them "commandments."

Buddha was aware that there is no metaphysical ghost of an "ought," and being the first positivist before positivism was ever thought of, his decalogue is officially called "avoiding the ten evils," not "the ten commandments," the latter being a popular term of later origin.

Granting that there is no metaphysical "ought" in the world and that it finds application only in the domain of animate life through the presence of the self or rather of many selves, we fail to see that the self is the creator of the norm of good and evil. We grant also that there are degrees of comprehending the nature of evil and that different applications naturally result under different conditions, we cannot for that reason argue that ethics are purely subjective and that there is no objective norm that underlies the moral evolution of mankind and comes out in the progress of civilisation more and more in its purity.

Nietzsche is like a schoolboy whose teacher is an inefficient pedant. He rebels against his authority and having had but poor instruction proclaims that the multiplication table is a mere superstition with which the old man tries to enslave the free minds of his scholars. Are there not different solutions possible of the same example and has not every one to regard his own solution as the right solution? How can the teacher claim that he is the standard of truth? Why, the very attempt at setting up a standard of any kind is tyranny and the recognition of it is a self-imposed slavery. There is no rightness save the rightness that can be maintained in a general hand-to-hand contest, for it is ultimately the fist that decides all controversies.

Nietzsche calls himself an atheist, he denies the existence of God in any form, and thus carries atheism to an extreme where it

breaks down in self-contradiction. We understand by God (whether personal, impersonal, or superpersonal) that something which determines the course of life ; the factors that shape the world, including ourselves ; the law to which we must adjust our conduct. Nietzsche enthrones the self in the place of God, but for all practical purposes his God is blunt success and survival of the fittest in the crude sense of the term ; for according to his philosophy the self must heed survival in the struggle for existence alone, and that, therefore, is his God.

Nietzsche's God is power, i. e., overwhelming force, which allows the wolf to eat the lamb. He ignores the power of the still small voice, the effectiveness of law in the world which makes it possible that man, the over-brute, is not the most ferocious, the most muscular, or the strongest animal. Nietzsche regards the cosmic order, in accommodation to which ethical codes have been invented, as a mere superstition. Thus it will come to pass that Nietzsche's type of the over-man, should it really make its appearance on earth, would be wiped out as surely as the lion, the king of the beasts, the proud pseudo-overbrute of the animals, will be exterminated in course of time. The lion has a chance for survival only behind the bars of the zoölogical gardens or when he allows himself to be tamed by man, that weakling among the brutes whose power has been built up by a comprehension of the sway of the invisible laws of life, physical, mental and moral.

Verily, the over-man will come, although he is not quite so near at hand as one might wish. He is at hand though, but he will not come such as Nietzsche announces him, in the storm of a catastrophe. The fire and the storm may precede the realisation of a higher humanity ; but the higher humanity will be found neither in the fire nor in the storm. The over-man will be born of the present man, not by a contempt for the shortcomings of the present man, but by a recognition of the essential features of man's manhood, by developing and purifying the truly human by making man conform to the eternal norm of rationality, humaneness and rightness of conduct.

What we need first is the standard of the higher man ; and on

this account we must purify our notions of the norm of truth and righteousness,—of God. Let us find first the over-God, and the over-man will develop naturally. The belief in an individual God-being is giving way to the recognition of a superpersonal God, the norm of scientific truth, the standard of right and wrong, the standard of worth by which we measure the value of our own being; and the kingdom of the genuine over-man will be established by the spread of the scientific comprehension of the world, in matters physical, social, intellectual, moral, and religious.

EDITOR.